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Executive summary 
MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY
Evidence has been limited on the impacts of the 2014 EU Audit Directive (implemented in 
2016) on European auditors, especially with respect to the regulatory, economic, and cultural 
differences among European countries. Four years after its implementation, it is considered 
timely to report on the impacts of the 2014 EU Audit Directive. This is one of the first studies 
providing clarity on the direct consequences of the 2014 EU Audit Directive for auditors and 
other participants in the audit and assurance market using a comparative perspective. The United 
Kingdom (UK) and Italy are purposively selected as representing two very different institutional 
settings, offering insights on how the efforts at standardising audit regulation may lead to very 
different organisational firm responses within Europe. For instance, in the UK, the corporate 
governance system is characterised by a relatively high degree of separation between ownership 
and control. The Italian corporate governance system, in contrast, has unique features that make 
it different from any other national systems in Europe. This is mainly the consequence of Italy 
having an under-developed stock exchange, with few publicly listed companies. The comparison 
of different institutional settings is deemed to be useful for gaining a better understanding of 
issues such as the standardisation/harmonisation of auditing standards and of auditing practices. 
The aim of the project is to undertake a comparative analysis of how the most recent EU audit 
reforms (implemented since 2016) have impacted external financial statement auditors in the 
market for audit and assurance services in both the UK and Italy.
 
 
THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
To arrive at its conclusions, the underlying methodology used in this study is essentially 
qualitative. We used focus groups and interviews in major business cities and regional 
centres such as London, Edinburgh, Milan, Rome, and Verona, to capture as wide a range of 
relevant opinions as possible from large and small audit practitioners and other stakeholders 
such as regulators, standard setters, audit committee members, investors, and professional 
bodies. Speaking with auditors enabled the authors to understand the underlying arguments, 
approaches, opinions, and procedures related to the issues under investigation. The relevant 
findings from this study for policymakers, regulators, and audit practitioners, regarding the 
impacts of regulatory changes in these two different institutional contexts, will assist with 
contrasting the implications from the EU Audit Directive (2014) under different institutional 
settings, and therefore will contribute to the debate regarding regulatory reform of the European 
audit markets.
KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
both the UK and Italy have implemented the extended audit report (although from different 
points in time), and this reform has affected auditors differently from the UK and Italy. This is more 
the case in Italy, as the UK already had enhanced disclosures in their audit reports before the EU 
Audit Directive (2014). These differences can be summarised as follows.
In the UK, the extended audit report has entailed:
• increased accessibility to information on auditors’ work and on professional scepticism;
• enhancing details on materiality judgements and threshold disclosures;
• new challenges in the interaction between auditors and company management; and
• some appreciation by financial analysts.
In Italy, it has fostered:
• increased task planning, quality controls, and verifications of the audit process;
• greater involvement of more senior or experienced auditors;
• increased interactions between auditors and audit clients at the executive level; and
• a lack of feedback or interest from financial analysts.
In relation to mandatory firm rotation, we observed differential impacts generally in both 
countries. For instance, in the UK, this is defined as quite radical, but a positive change, while it 
is ‘nothing new’ for Italy. In brief, observations on the impacts of mandatory rotations in the UK 
include:
• the advantage of having a ‘fresh pair of eyes’;
• increases in tendering costs; and
• increased time allocated to building more knowledge about a new client.
In Italy, instead, insights about the long-term experience with mandatory firm rotation include:
• confirmation of some positive effects on audit quality;
• continuous reduction of audit fees within tendering proposals to obtain the engagement; and
• increased frequency of auditors’ activities to ‘get to know’ the new client.
ICAEW
4
EU AUDIT REFORMS: ANALYSING DIFFERENT IMPACTS IN THE UK AND ITALY
ICAEW
5
EU AUDIT REFORMS: ANALYSING DIFFERENT IMPACTS IN THE UK AND ITALY
In relation to the provision of non-audit services (NAS), the EU Audit Directive (2014) made little 
change in the UK. This was also true in Italy, where existing practices were already in place to 
deal with NAS restrictions or concerns. In both countries similar impacts of NAS restrictions are 
highlighted in this study with reference to mainly non-big Four auditors. In the UK only, NAS 
restrictions and caps are seen to foster: 
• prioritisation of NAS provision to larger companies if more lucrative than audits; and
• increased attention to auditor independence in view of the new tendering processes.
In both the UK and Italy, such restrictions are interpreted as providing more opportunities for 
non-big Four auditors to sell NAS or audit services to new clients.
The ultimate and overarching conclusion of this report is that, after several successive EU Directives 
to regulate audit practices in the audit and assurance markets to harmonise these practices 
throughout the EU, the process of harmonisation remains difficult to achieve because of the 
significant differences that characterise European countries. Indeed, countries such as the UK and 
Italy have significant institutional and cultural differences that affect how such implementation 
of EU Directives takes place, and this study finds differences in how the latest EU audit reforms 
(implemented since 2016) have impacted these two very different European countries.
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1.  Introduction
Given the implementation in 2016 of the EU Audit Directive (2014) and its aim to support a 
harmonisation process of European auditing regulation, an understanding of the impacts of such 
reforms on auditors and their work practices is needed. Currently, there is very little research on 
audit firms’ implementation of these EU audit reforms and how they affect auditor practice and 
overall performance. Field research is required to assess the results of changes in audit practices 
imposed by regulatory intervention, how these changes affect internal quality controls within 
audit firms, and whether such intervention ultimately leads to a more consistent audit quality 
level for these firms across countries. 
Previous international studies on auditing practices have shown how past European reforms have 
been implemented with a significant degree of difference in the UK and Italy due to the relevant 
cultural differences among these countries (Stevenson, 2002). both the UK and Italy responded 
to corporate collapses, accounting scandals and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by issuing new 
rules on corporate governance and audit, albeit by focusing on different mechanisms. The UK 
accountancy firms and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have faced renewed scrutiny from 
the investor public and the UK Government (CMA report, 2018; Kingman review, 2018; brydon 
review, 2019). This has led to recent moves in the UK where the Big Four accounting firms must 
implement operational separation of their UK auditing and consulting practices by 2024 (Davis, 
2020). Although the UK experience related to the EU audit reforms was somewhat positive until 
these recent developments (Kend and basioudis, 2018), questions remain as to how it compares 
to other European countries, given the diversity of the EU requirements and the existence of 
member state options and interpretation issues (Kend and basioudis, 2018). Like the UK, a few 
major corporate scandals and the eruption of the GFC occurred in Italy in the first decade of the 
2000s (eg, Parmalat and Cirio), forcing Italy to revise its corporate governance and audit regime 
(Enriques and Volpin, 2007). Italy modified its long-standing provisions on mandatory audit firm 
rotation, renewable engagement terms, and cooling-off periods and introduced audit partner 
rotation. To such an end, the UK and Italy offer a suitable setting because they represent two 
contrasting models of European regulatory, economic and cultural background (Nobes, 1998).
The aim of the project is to undertake a comparative analysis of how the EU Audit Directive 
(2014) has impacted external financial statement auditors in the market for audit and assurance 
services in both the UK and Italy. Evidence is still limited on the impacts of these EU audit 
reforms on European auditors, especially with respect to the regulatory, economic and cultural 
differences among European countries. The comparison of two different institutional settings 
is deemed to be useful for policymakers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of 
issues such as the standardisation/harmonisation of auditing standards and of auditing practices. 
Hence, the broad objective of the study is to address the general research questions:
How do the impacts on auditors of the latest EU reforms to audit compare between the 
UK and Italy? And how have these EU reforms affected audit firms in both countries?
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To address these research questions, we compare the overall impacts of these reforms in the UK 
and Italy and consider the perceptions of both large and small audit practitioners in doing so. 
Focus groups and interviews were conducted in both major business cities and more regional 
centres, such as London, Edinburgh, Milan, Rome and Verona. Face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews were used for participants who could not join the allocated focus group times. We also 
used face-to-face interviews as a follow-up with some audit partners and senior audit managers/
directors who participated in pilot testing during 2017. The focus groups and office interviews, 
each lasting approximately two hours, were conducted throughout the last six months of 2018 
and first six months of 2019. When possible, focus groups and interviews were audio recorded 
to capture the detail of these discussions. In the two countries, in total 50 participants were 
involved during 2018 and 2019. To ensure quality control, at least two members of the research 
team participated at every focus group run or interview. Some pilot testing of the questions was 
undertaken during 2017 in both the UK and Italy, and this was primarily the method of refining 
the questions we asked participants. Thematic analysis was used to discover themes and draw 
conclusions. The data collected were coded to identify dominant themes within the stakeholder 
groups involved in this research. The dominant themes identified were compared to highlight 
similarities and differences between the two countries. Using NVIVO, 12 software textual patterns 
were identified from the interview transcriptions to detect trends and themes within the data 
that prompted certain conclusions. Table 1 provides the demographics of participants from the 
UK and Italy, where 10 of the 23 UK participants and 13 of the 27 Italian participants are audit 
partners. The respondents were predominately from London, Verona and Milan and had a wealth 
of experience in the accounting and auditing fields.
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Regulators >15yrs (3) London (3) >15yrs (1)
>30yrs (3)
Rome (4)
Standard Setters >30yrs (1) London (1) - -







Non-Big Four Audit 
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Investors >15yrs (2) London (2) - -
Chief Financial Officers >30yrs (1) Edinburgh (1) - -
Professional Body 
Members (staff)
10–14yrs (4) London (3)
Edinburgh (1)
- -












¹ bSA refers to the board of Statutory Auditors. These only exist within Italian corporate governance bodies. They are an 
independent board appointed by shareholders to supervise the board of directors and increase the minority shareholders’ 




EU AUDIT REFORMS: ANALYSING DIFFERENT IMPACTS IN THE UK AND ITALY
2.  The EU Audit Directive 2014    
 (implemented in 2016)
According to a recent EU Parliamentary Report (2019), the EU Audit Directive (2014) came into 
being in the aftermath of the GFC. Its major aim was to strengthen confidence in the integrity of 
reported financial statements and improve audit quality. In achieving this goal, one of the main 
objectives of the EU Audit Directive (2014) was to make the top end of the audit market more 
dynamic (Horton et al, 2018). In the aftermath of the GFC, significant weaknesses were identified 
in the statutory audit function; and these weaknesses were cited as a factor in auditors failing to 
provide any warning signals about troubled banks (see eg, Humphrey, Loft and Woods, 2009). 
This strong criticism started to raise concerns about the accuracy of audited financial statements 
of large companies, and intensified issues around auditor independence (EU Parliament 2019). 
There are however a range of factors (such as close business relationships, long tenures, the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services, etc) which constrained auditors from behaving in an 
independent manner. Regulatory intervention and indeed sanctions – including those relating to 
corporate governance – have been deemed necessary to ensure that auditors do carry out their 
work and make their judgements in an independent manner (Gwilliam and Marnet, 2015).
The key changes included in the European audit reforms (2014) were the extended audit 
report, bans, caps and restrictions on non-audit services, more powers for audit committees and 
mandatory firm rotation by auditors. The stricter requirements that apply to the statutory audit of 
public interest entities (PIEs), based on the implementation of the EU Audit Directive from 2016 
are as follows. 
• Strengthening the requirements of the audit report, and introducing an additional, more 
detailed report to the audit committee, containing thorough information about the performance 
of the audit.
• Introducing a maximum 10-year firm rotation with the option for member states to choose 
shorter periods (eg, Italy opted for 9-year mandatory audit firm rotation) for PIEs. A further 
10 years can be added, up to a maximum of 20 years, where a public tendering process is 
conducted (ICAEW, 2016). For joint audit arrangements, a further 14 years is allowed, up to a 
maximum of 24 years (ICAEW, 2016).
• Establishing a list of non-audit services that cannot be provided by the statutory auditor  
or audit firm to the audited entity, as well as imposing limitations on the fees charged for 
non-audit services.
The extended audit report has been introduced by regulators with two aims. The first aim is 
to provide a real focus on the issues that are being addressed in the audit. The second aim is 
to have the auditors stating more information about the audit itself. In addition, the EU Audit 
Directive (2014) intends to address auditor independence concerns through the introduction of 
mandatory rotation which, at the general level, can entail: (1) mandatory partner rotation; and 
(2) mandatory audit firm rotation. Such changes aim at increasing audit quality and may impact 
auditors’ organisational and managerial practices. Audit committees of PIEs assume a prominent 
direct role in the appointment of the statutory audit firm, as well as in the monitoring of the audit 
process (FRC 2007, 2009, 2010). They are now required to rotate auditors periodically, though 
the period may vary across member states. The general rule is that the auditors must be rotated 
at least every ten years. However, member states may choose to reduce this period to a shorter 
period or may also permit PIEs to continue with the incumbent auditor for a maximum of  
20 years if a transparent tender procedure has taken place, or for a maximum of 24 years if there 
have been joint audits.
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The EU Audit Directive (2014) also has introduced specific restrictions on a range of non-
audit services (NAS) that PIEs in the EU can obtain from the audit firm and its network (eg, 
certain tax and legal services, bookkeeping and preparing financial statements, designing and 
implementing internal control or risk management procedures related to the preparation of 
financial information, and related technology systems). These types of restrictions related to NAS 
are not entirely new as the US had introduced prohibitions on a range of NAS provisions via the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (US) some 14 years prior to the EU Audit Directive (2014). Finally, 
the EU audit reform requires the total fees from NAS to be limited to no more than 70% of the 
average of the fees paid in the last three consecutive financial years for the statutory audit of the 
client. These actions by the EU support the findings of a prior ICAEW report (Gwilliam, Marnet 
and Teng, 2014) that stated that ‘in circumstances where the benefits of the joint provision of 
NAS to client companies cannot be unequivocally demonstrated, the logical regulatory response 
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3.  Differential impacts of the EU Audit  
 Directive on UK and Italian auditors
In this section, we firstly discuss the impacts of the reforms on the extended audit reports, and 
then reveal insights on mandatory firm rotation and the provision of NAS. 
 
3.1 IMPACTS OF EXTENDED AUDIT REPORTS
As a result of several UK reforms before the EU Audit Directive (2014), the UK has seen more 
pages in the audit report and more careful consideration of the wording of the audit report, 
which is no longer standardised. There is an acknowledgement in the UK that the extended 
audit report is now quite long. Mainly, the concerns raised in the UK were that, due to increased 
regulatory scrutiny, auditors’ risk management systems and internal quality controls within audit 
firms had to be improved, and that this was a distraction from the audit process and reporting 
side. The findings from the UK also indicate that the extended audit reports are an improvement 
over the old form reports, mainly because of: (1) increased accessibility to information on the 
auditors’ work; and (2) materiality threshold disclosures. The extended audit report has given 
external auditors a licence to think out of the box, be more creative, demonstrate scepticism, 
and to have more freedom to express how they reached their judgements. This greater 
transparency provides interesting evidence against enhancements promoting boilerplate 
disclosures by auditors.
’I know a lot of people who […] tell me that it [the extended audit report] has focused 
their minds. It has given them an element of creativity that they did not have before to say 
what they really think.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, LONDON).
Consideration could be given to the ordering of the information that goes into the extended 
audit report, although this was not raised by many UK participants. The concept of an audit 
expectations gap suggests that society’s view of the auditors’ role is different from how 
auditors themselves view their true role to be (Koh and Woo, 1998). For instance, the brydon 
Review (2019) identified fraud and auditors’ related responsibilities as the most complex and 
misunderstood of all the topics covered by the review and the UK Government in response 
has since proposed a package of measures, including greater clarity regarding the respective 
roles of directors and auditors, to restore public confidence in auditors’ work (Department 
for business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, 2021). Further, there is the audit expectations-
performance gap, which is defined as the gap between society’s expectations of auditors and 
auditors’ perceived performance (Porter, 1993). Researchers are concerned with investigating 
the factors contributing to the audit expectations gap and proposing solutions to help narrow 
the gap. One might argue that the disclosure of materiality thresholds might help with the 
audit expectations gap problem, and better assist stakeholders to understand the concept of 
materiality (De Martinis and burrowes, 1996). In the UK, materiality thresholds are disclosed in 
audit reports, whereas in Italy this is not the case. In the UK, materiality disclosures were generally 
seen in a positive light by the participants in this present study, as a reform that genuinely assists 
in narrowing the audit expectations gap. More disclosures of going concern work in the key audit 
matters section has also helped improve transparency in this respect according to the UK participants. 
Some UK participants indicated that – out of all the additional disclosures in audit reports – materiality 
thresholds and the related information were the single most important audit reform:
ICAEW
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‘If anything, that we have done over the last 30 years to help address the audit 
expectations gap, I think this [materiality disclosures] has done more for that than 
anything else up until this point in time.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, LONDON)
In the UK, when we asked about the impacts on the auditors’ relationship with clients, many 
of the participants indicated that the extended audit report has generally improved this 
relationship by better demonstrating: (1) the application of professional scepticism; and 
(2) the outcomes of an audit for company management. As the auditors are required to say 
a bit more about the audit than in the past, this has been perceived as an opportunity to 
provide more information and disclosure about the audit process to the outside world. The 
reform is perceived to have given auditors some more responsibilities to talk about the issues 
surrounding the audit in the report. Thus, as the brydon review (2019) emphasised, there is a 
need for enhancing the informative content of the audit product. The audit report now better 
creates the opportunity for auditors to give financial statement users some sense of what the 
audit looks like in terms of scope. More disclosure on materiality thresholds and going concern 
work disclosed in the key audit matters (KAMs) section of the audit report has helped with 
narrowing the audit expectations gap. This behaviour is in line with the new requirements 
introduced by the revised auditing standard on ‘Going Concern’ ISA 570, which has increased 
the workload of auditors when assessing companies’ going concern for accounting periods 
starting on or after 15 December 2019 (FRC, 2019). 
If we move the focus now over to Italy, Italian big Four auditors agree that the extended audit 
report EU reform has introduced a significant change for the organisation and the management 
of their audit activity after the reform was enforced in 2016. Like the UK, they have recognised 
how the length of the report has increased. From a two-page report, auditors are now preparing 
a six- to twelve-page report (on average). We can summarise the organisational impact on 
Italian auditors in terms of three main impacts: (1) the need to plan their auditing tasks more in 
advance; (2) the greater involvement of more senior or experienced auditors for quality controls 
throughout the auditing process; and (3) the incremental rise in the number of internal notes 
to document the audit process. This indicates that Italian auditors were more affected by the 
extension of the audit report than their UK counterparts, thus providing further evidence of how 
pronounced differences in audit practice are related to the audit report and its disclosures across 
different legislative jurisdictions within Europe.
Italian auditors show a general satisfaction regarding the extended audit report and how it has 
positively affected the market. Although auditors feared that, in view of the new audit report, 
the augmented disclosure would have exposed them to higher risks of being dismissed by 
clients or of lawsuits, they now recognise that the investors have appreciated the new form audit 
report. While previously, the audit report’s primary readers went straight to the audit report’s 
conclusions, the whole of this extended audit report has gained their attention for the first time, 
and they are reportedly reading the entire report with more attention:
‘We [the auditors] always carry out the audit activity in the same way but we have changed 
the way we report it. […] this is positive because, even if the extended audit report requires 
us a greater effort, it allows us to better communicate now with third parties.’  
(BIG FOUR AUDITOR, VERONA) 
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There is a sea change in Italy, with more work undertaken earlier in the audit, more 
communication with management above the CFO level, and more hours spent on the audit to 
verify what is going into the extended audit report. Appreciation of the higher transparency of 
the extended audit report was confirmed by the Italian regulators we interviewed. This greater 
transparency has led to a positive reaction by investors in both countries, although reactions 
from financial analysts have been more positively felt by the UK at this stage than Italy, based 
on our findings. Appreciation of the extended audit report by financial analysts and investors in 
the UK is somehow comforting compared to recent FRC reviews (CMA report, 2018). Auditors 
in Italy indicated that during the first year of implementation of the extended audit report, 
financial analysts did not show much appreciation or interest. Financial analysts in Italy had 
adopted a more cautionary approach, being the first year of implementation, which explains 
these observations shared by Italian auditors we interviewed. While Italian auditors seemed quite 
surprised by this reaction from financial analysts during the first year, they have since recognised 
that Italian financial analysts have now started to rely more on the extended audit report. 
 
 
3.2 MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRM AND AUDIT PARTNER
Most UK participants agreed that having the same auditor for well over 20 years is not perceived 
well, and that the newly introduced audit firm rotation policy is assisting greatly in mitigating 
these concerns. The positive aspects that emerged from the interviews and focus groups on 
mandatory firm rotation in the UK centre around the elimination of concerns surrounding long 
tenures, and the advantages of having a ‘fresh pair of eyes’, or a new auditor with a ‘rethink’ or 
fresh perspective on the audit. The CMA report (2018) highlighted having new insights and 
challenges from a new auditor as benefits. Moreover, the mandatory firm rotation is a significant 
change, as it was suggested that it will have a more substantial impact than audit partner rotation, 
perhaps leading to a complete rethink of the whole audit process after many years of the same 
approach being adopted by the same audit firm:
‘I think firm rotation is good in many ways. … I think there is a perception issue. I think that 
– whereas rotation of audit partners every five years was helpful, the truth of the matter is 
that it does not really create – or very rarely does it create – a radical rethink of the audit.’ 
(AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR, LONDON)
Among the UK participants, some negative impacts are indicated when referring to the new 
mandatory audit firm rotation from the EU audit reform (implemented since 2016). The main 
concerns were expressed around three main aspects: (1) the potential increase of the tendering 
costs; (2) the increase in the time taken to build the necessary experience with a new client; 
and (3) the sufficiency of existing regulation already provided by UK laws (prior to the EU audit 
reforms implemented in 2016), such as mandatory audit partner rotation.
With reference to the first and second aspects, views gathered suggest that UK participants are 
already forecasting what has already happened in Italy after 45 years of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. The implementation costs of audit firm rotation, such as the tendering process and 
the initial years of learning the processes and business of a new audit client, are predicted to 
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continue to increase in the UK. The learning curve costs are typically borne by the audit firms; 
however, these costs over time would be passed back onto the clients via audit fees, therefore 
increasing the costs of statutory audits to the wider society in general. Among several auditors’ 
opinions on this point, the following are particularly relevant:
‘The cost of tendering is huge in terms of the audit market here in the UK, like to get 
to know the strategy plans of a new client and then go through various standards and 
produce thorough documentation for a new client.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, LONDON)
‘Firms will be forced to incur the costs of participating in audit tenders that they may not 
have much chance of winning. Choices also need to be made about whether firms wish to 
provide audit or non-audit services to clients – choices that may be very difficult to change 
if circumstances later change.’ (CFO, EDINBURGH)
These issues related to high costs of tendering, especially the invariable costs of submitting 
either a winning or losing tender, which are likely to be similar, where the probability of success 
is relatively low, particularly for challenger firms, may put more weight to the CMA (2018) 
recommendation of joint or shared audits, if done outside the normal auditor rotation cycle. This 
remedy could improve resilience in the market by allowing smaller firms to grow and become 
more competitive in the tender process.
While, for the UK, the mandatory firm rotation constitutes a significant change in audit practice, 
Italy has been dealing with such a norm, as well as mandatory partner rotation, for quite a while. 
Indeed, from 1975, Italy has adopted the mandatory firm rotation of a nine-year period – and 
later a mandatory seven-year partner rotation (Corbella et al, 2015). As a result, it is not surprising 
that, in Italy, auditors indicate that the mandatory audit firm rotation from the EU audit reform has 
not entailed a real change. Participants in Italy indicated that they have long been used to more 
frequent tenders and their related timing considerations. They are convinced that the mandatory 
firm rotation requirement of the EU audit reforms is more of a ‘trauma’ for countries such as 
Germany and the UK, where auditors have been auditing the same companies for many years:
‘[in] other countries like Germany and the United Kingdom where audited companies used 
to have the same auditor for 40 to 50 years; in these entities, there has been a real change 
in the business model, since, before the introduction of this new rule, an auditor would have 
provided a client with audit services up until retirement.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, MILAN)
As indicated by Italian auditors, who have been dealing with mandatory firm rotation for 
decades, the tendering process as well as the management of cooling-off periods has been 
the norm, with no significant implications for their activities and organisational practices. This 
is confirmed also by audit committee/BSA members who in general indicated other EU audit 
reforms (ie, the extended audit report) as the real change in audit for Italy. However, due to 
a longer practice of mandatory audit firm rotation, Italian auditors, and audit committee/BSA 
members, were able to provide insights based on their longer experience about the long-term 
consequences of such practices. Italian auditors confirmed some benefits of the rotation system 
on audit quality, like the benefits from a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ over the audit engagement. However, 
they also indicated that such a system has entailed other consequences, such as: (1) continuous 
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reduction of audit fees; and (2) more frequent entry activities to ‘get to know the new client’. 
Firstly, after every audit firm rotation, the audit fee is generally said to reduce, which generally 
assists success in the tendering process, while the continuous change in regulations requires 
additional effort that is not adequately remunerated by the audit and assurance market. This 
is a source of frustration for Italian auditors, as, typically, increased audit effort is accompanied 
by increased (and not decreased) audit fees. However, to have more success in the tendering 
process, they are sacrificing their audit fee margins. A ‘loss-leading’ practice is one in which 
auditors compete for clients by reducing their fees for statutory audits.
‘Every time an auditor changes according to the firm rotation policy, our remuneration 
[audit fee] decreases by around 20-30%.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, VERONA)
Secondly, the activities for new incoming auditors to ‘get to know their clients’ have become 
more frequent. Especially in large and complex international groups, such activities can be time 
consuming and costly for the audit firm, and a distraction from some parts of the audit process, 
based on the insights from Italian participants:
‘The firm rotation mainly influences groups that are quite complicated. […] It takes auditors 
nearly two years or more to understand exactly where they are.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, VERONA)
 
 
3.3 IMPACTS OF THE RESTRICTIONS AND CAPS ON NON-AUDIT SERVICES (NAS)
In the UK, the introduction of the restrictions on NAS have pushed audit firms to make strategic 
decisions and, in some cases, to prioritise the provisions of NAS to large companies rather than 
take on low margin or loss-making audits. Some PIEs are adopting the approach of using two of 
the Big Four firms for NAS and keeping a third firm relatively ‘clean’ in case they need to change 
auditors. This effectively means that a company has a choice of one (big Four) when it needs to or 
wants to change auditors from the incumbent. While some audit firms are searching for the more 
lucrative NAS work as a priority to new audit work, clients are negotiating the fine balance of 
maintaining audit independence and having enough auditor choice when it comes to tendering. 
Some audits will be profitable and/or strategically important, so in some cases the provision of 
NAS is not necessarily the priority.
‘You are starting to see already some Big Four firms are having to be bullied by big 
companies to compete for their audit tenders because they prefer to maintain their 
independence leading to the consulting work (NAS). I know of one big company, that had 
to tell one of the Big Four firms, “If you do not bid for our audit, we will never give you any 
further consulting work”.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, LONDON)
In both the UK and Italy, there is general agreement that the NAS reforms will create more 
opportunities for non-big Four auditors to sell NAS or audit services to new clients due to the 
restrictions that the EU reforms impose. Some auditors in the UK have argued that it will be 
up to audit committees to decide whether they wish to be more associated with the smaller 
practitioners, whether this is for audit services or non-audit services. The 2018 CMA report 
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found that the average sales of NAS to audit clients appears to be slightly higher for the smaller 
firms than for the Big Four (in 2018). Some argue that, with future audit tenders in mind, smaller 
practitioners are being considered for new NAS work, to allow for relationship building. Audit 
tendering considerations are impacting the allocation of NAS work based on the views of the 
participants in the UK. In the UK there are limited instances of companies using the non-big Four 
for other services to test the water in a build up to appointing them as auditor. In Italy we found 
that the non-big Four auditors are building up skills in delivering prohibited NAS, that the big 
Four incumbents cannot deliver. This was not observed in the UK.
‘I think we have the smaller firms getting more non-audit work. As to whether that is 
because of the non-audit services ban and the fee cap I think is moot point because I think 
it is more to do with the “How can we get to know these firms for future tenders?”.’  
(BIG FOUR AUDITOR, LONDON)
In Italy, participating big Four auditors recognise that being part of a multidisciplinary network 
is an advantage, because audit teams’ specialists (eg, information technology, tax, risk 
management) help improve audit quality:
‘Certain activities cannot be carried out on audit clients, but they [field specialists] can 
help maintain within the network those same competencies that, on the one hand, are 
useful to the audit team to perform a good work and, on the other hand, may be offered 
to the market as far as non-audit clients are concerned.’ (BIG FOUR AUDITOR, MILAN)
In Italy non-big Four auditors aim at collaborating with big Four auditors rather than competing 
directly. On several occasions, non-big Four auditors admitted that they are making more and 
more effort to build and strengthen their competitiveness on NAS by leveraging their high 
specialisation. In this way, they aim to become the main, local service providers of audit clients 
of big Four companies, as far as restricted or prohibited NAS are concerned. As a result, Italian 
auditors from non-Big Four firms indicate how they continuously develop advisory services 
related to tax and legal support, which are the main prohibited NAS activities. This is similar to 
what is happening in France in relation to the mandatory joint audit, which is providing non-big 
Four firms with the opportunity to gather experience and expertise, make connections, and break 
into a market that is currently rather closed to the UK firms. This strategy is not yet adopted by 
the UK non-Big Four firms, representing an important point of difference. The CMA report (2018) 
indicated that when it came to tenders, some challenger firms were not considered to have 
the capability or ‘global footprint’, and thus were precluded from the invitation to tender. The 
solution then could be that Big Four and challenger firms arrange joint or shared audits which 
will assist in the sharing of fees in the UK and in the building of the expertise to acquire more 
experience for challenger firms.
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4.  Conclusions
both the UK and Italy have implemented the extended audit report, and this reform has affected 
differently auditors from the UK and Italy. In Italy more so, the extended audit report has 
affected auditors’ relationships with their audit clients and has led to significant changes in their 
organisational practices and in the management of their audit practices; whereas in the UK, the 
EU audit reform has not led to significant changes since 2016, as the UK already had enhanced 
disclosures in their audit reports. Related to mandatory firm rotation, we observed differential 
impacts in general in both countries: in the UK, this is defined as quite a radical change, although 
seen as positive; while it is ‘nothing new’ for Italy; and besides the overall positive experience, 
some negative perspectives were also shared by the Italian participants. Related to the provision 
of NAS, the EU reforms since 2016 made little change in the UK audit and assurance services 
market, as the Auditing Practices board (APb)’s Ethical Standard 5 (ES5) in 2011 had introduced a 
requirement that audit committees consider the scale and nature of NAS provided to companies 
by their auditor (Gwilliam, Marnet and Teng, 2014). In addition, ES5 identifies specific NAS which 
present a threat to auditors’ independence so significant that no safeguards are likely to reduce 
the threat(s) to audit independence to an acceptable level (Gwilliam, Marnet and Teng, 2014). 
The 2011 ES5 prohibitions in the UK (although not considered statutory restrictions) are not 
dissimilar to those prohibited in the US by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This is also the case 
in Italy, where existing practices were already in place to deal with NAS restrictions. However, 
both UK and Italian audit firms are considering NAS provision and EU restrictions when choosing 
strategically their participation in the tendering process of PIEs. A summary of the main impacts 
of the EU Audit Directive (2014) on auditors, their clients, and these two capital markets (the UK 
and Italy) is provided in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Summary of the main impacts of the EU Audit Directive (2014) on auditors, their 
clients, and on these two capital markets (the UK and Italy).
IMPACTS OF THE EXTENDED AUDIT REPORT (EAR)
UK • Improved audit report thanks to increased accessibility to information on the auditors’ work  
and materiality threshold disclosures.
• Freedom to express how professional scepticism is applied and judgements are reached.
• Challenges in the interaction between auditors and company management.
• Some appreciation of the audit report by financial analysts.
Italy • Need to plan the auditing tasks more in advance.
• Greater involvement of more senior or experienced auditors in quality controls throughout the 
audit process.
• The incremental rise in the number of internal notes to document the audit process.
• Initial concerns on possible exposure to lawsuits turned into an appreciation for information 
sharing about the auditor’s role.
• Increased number of executives with which the auditors now interact.
• Lack of feedback, interest, or appreciation from financial analysts.
MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRMS AND AUDIT PARTNERS
UK • Views shared indicating firm rotation is quite a radical change for the UK.
• Elimination of concerns surrounding long tenures with the incoming advantage of having a 
‘fresh pair of eyes’.
• Potential increases in tendering costs.
• Increased time necessary to build the necessary experience with a new audit client.
• Sufficiency of the UK regulations prior to the implementation of the EU audit reforms in 2016, 
eg, related to mandatory audit partner rotation.
Italy • Long-standing practices with positive effects on audit quality.
• Continuous reduction of audit fees in tendering proposals to obtain the engagement.
• Issues with the auditors’ learning curve (ie, time to get to know the client) upon starting a  
new tenure.
IMPACTS OF THE RESTRICTIONS AND CAPS ON NON-AUDIT SERVICES (NAS)
UK • Strategic decisions to prioritise the provision of NAS to larger companies (when these are more 
lucrative than audits).
• Clients’ attempt to balance between auditor independence concerns and enough choice for the 
new tendering processes.
• More opportunities for non-big Four auditors to sell NAS or audit services to new clients.
Italy • More opportunities for non-big Four auditors to sell NAS or audit services to new clients.
• Non-big Four auditors committed to providing specialised advisory services related to taxation 
and legal support, which are the main prohibited NAS activities.
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